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I. Introduction
"This is an issue about the future. It is an issue that affects our
children ... it is an issue about the economy [and] security."' High gasoline
prices, high heating bills, and questions about foreign oil dependence have
pushed the energy industry to the forefront of the political scene.2 On August
8, 2005 Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005)' to
address these concerns and plan for America's energy future. In the 1,700
pages of EPAct 2005, Congress drastically changed the electric utility
regulatory regime, and this new regulatory regime will play a large role in the
achievement of the goals of EPAct 2005.4
The prior electric utility regulatory regime was established by the 1935
Public Utility Act (1935 Act).5 Through two titles the 1935 Act created parallel
tracks of regulation.6 Title I, the Public Utility Holding Company Act
(PUHCA), directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
simplify, restructure, and regulate electric utility holding companies.7 Title II
amended the Federal Power Act (FPA) and gave the Federal Power
Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission-FERC) the
power to oversee interstate wholesale sales of power.8 The SEC and the FERC
have regulated on these parallel tracks for the past seventy years. 9 EPAct 2005
1. 151 CONG. REc. H2383, 2384 (2005) (statement of Rep. Blackburn).
2. See 151 CONG. REc. S6601 (2005) (discussing the many justifications for a
comprehensive energy policy bill).
3. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (providing the
provisions for a new regulatory structure).
4. See id. at tit. 12 (increasing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's role in
energy regulation by repealing Title I of the Public Utility Act of 1935).
5. See Public Utility Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803 (giving the SEC and the FERC their
initial electric utility regulatory duties).
6. See id. at tits. I & II (delegating regulatory duties to both the SEC and the FERC).
7. See id. at tit. I (presenting the Public Utility Holding Company Act).
8. See id. at tit. II (amending the FPA); see also discussion infra Part II.B (detailing the
factors that spurred Congress to amend the FPA). In 1977, Congress reorganized the Federal
Power Commission as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. See CHARLES F. PHILLIPS,
JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILmES 655 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the Department of
Energy's reorganization).




repeals PUHCA, and creates a unified track of regulation, which will shape the
future of the electric utility industry.'0
The FERC is now the sole electric utility regulatory commission, and its
regulatory behavior has the potential either to hinder or advance the mission of
EPAct 2005." Regulatory commissions develop unique regulatory
personalities, and a commission's regulatory personality determines the
characteristics of the resulting regulatory environment. 12  The 1935 Act,
combined with the history and tradition of the respective commissions,
influenced the development of two distinct regulatory commissions. 3 In
administering the 1935 Act, the FERC and the SEC formed two distinct
regulatory personalities and produced extremely different regulatory
environments.14 The SEC, using a proactive and comprehensive approach to
regulation, produced an efficient and stable regulatory environment.15 In
contrast, the FERC became a reactive agency characterized by fragmented
policies, producing an inefficient and unstable regulatory environment.'
6
EPAct 2005 anticipates great developments and growth in the energy industry.
It will be difficult to achieve these goals without a stable, predictable, and
efficient electric utility regulatory environment. 17
10. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1263, 119 Stat. 594 (repealing
PUHCA):
11. See RicHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MKius, THE POLTICS OF REGULAToRY CHANGE:
A TALE OF Two AGENCIES 3 (1989) ("The study of contemporary regulatory affairs offers a
distinctive opportunity to grapple with weightier questions of democracy, citizenship, the
evolution of the administrative state, and the role of ideas in American politics."). This Note
focuses on the qualitative factors that impact and result from a regulatory regime change. For a
full discussion of the concepts embodied in a qualitative analysis and a regulatory regime, see
id. at 23-52. To examine the weightier questions effectively, it is necessary to bolster a case
study with an historical and philosophical treatment to illuminate broader political implications
and how underlying ideas help transform institutions. Id. at 3-4.
12. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 2217, 2239 (2005) (discussing the culture and expertise of the FERC, and the influence of
such factors on regulation).
13. See discussion infra Parts 11-III (discussing the origin of the SEC and the FERC's
foundational principles).
14. See discussion infra Part III (juxtaposing the regulatory personality and regulatory
environment of the SEC against the regulatory personality and regulatory environment of the
FERC).
15. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing the factors that led to the SEC's proactive
and comprehensive regulatory personality and providing decisions that reflect this personality).
16. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the factors that led to the creation of
FERC's regulatory personality and providing decisions that illustrate the reactive and
fragmented policies of the FERC).
17. See PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 49 (discussing economic concepts of regulation). If
regulation is supposed to be a substitute for competition, then the goal should be to provide a
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EPAct 2005 imposes significant changes in the electric utility regulatory
regime, and these changes provide the FERC with the opportunity to reform its
regulatory personality.' 8 If the FERC looks to the SEC as a regulatory role
model and adopts a proactive and comprehensive approach to regulation, a
stable and efficient regulatory environment will likely result, making the goals
of EPAct 2005 readily achievable.' 9 Recent FERC actions indicate that the
FERC is embracing new patterns of regulation, but old habits die hard.2°
Although recent actions indicate a change in the FERC's regulatory approach,
the next few years will be crucial in determining whether the FERC is
embracing its new mission or regressing to familiar patterns.2' It will be
difficult to achieve the goals of EPAct 2005 unless the FERC adopts a new
regulatory personality.
This Note focuses on the interplay between the regulatory personality of a
commission and the resulting regulatory environment, specifically the degree to
which the FERC's regulatory personality will hinder or advance the goals of
EPAct 2005. In Part II, this Note describes the historical background and
founding principles of the electric utility regulatory commissions and discusses
formation of the SEC and the FERC's foundational principles. Part III
illustrates how the regulatory personalities of the SEC and the FERC have
shaped electricity regulation and discusses the connection between regulatory
environments and the achievement of Congressional goals. In Part IV, this
Note shifts focus to recent FERC actions that suggest the FERC is developing a
new regulatory personality. Additionally, Part IV discusses future regulatory
patterns that will help to evaluate FERC's regulatory personality in the
upcoming years. This Note concludes, in Part V, that the FERC has laid the
foundation to produce an efficient and stable regulatory environment, but
practitioners may need to hold the FERC accountable to its new regulatory path
if the goals of EPAct 2005 are to be achieved.
regulatory environment that produces results similar to a free market environment. Id. To
facilitate the growth and development that occurs in market conditions, predictability is
necessary to facilitate efficient corporate functions and provide an environment conducive to
innovation. See infra Part III.A (showing that the SEC's predictable and stable regulatory
environment furthered industry growth and development).
18. See infra Part II.A (describing how the PUHCA provisions influenced the SEC's
regulatory personality); discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the statutory roots of the FERC's
commitment to ratepayer protection).
19. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the FERC's disastrous generic rate of return rule).
20. See infra Part IV.C (discussing recent actions that illustrate a potential change in
FERC's regulatory approach).
21. See infra Part IV (discussing prospective factors to consider in assessing the true
change in FERC's regulatory approach).
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11. Parallel Tracks of Regulation
It would be difficult to understand the nature and consequences of the
changes in the electric utility industry today without a clear understanding of
the traditional structure of the industry and patterns of regulation.22 The 1935
Act was designed to address two specific problems in the electric utility
industry. 23 In the two-titled Act, Congress vested the SEC and the FERC with
the power to solve two distinct problems.2 4 In Title I, Congress directed the
SEC to further investor protection by regulating complex corporate holding
company structures.25 In Title II, Congress closed a regulatory gap and vested
the FERC with the duty to protect ratepayers by, among other things, regulating
the rates of interstate wholesale sales of electricity.26 Thus, the 1935 Act laid
the foundation for two fundamentally different regulatory commissions, but
only the SEC was successful in producing a stable and efficient regulatory
environment.
27
A. The SEC Protects the Investors
Congress vested the SEC, the agency most familiar with economic
matters, with the responsibility of regulating complex holding company
systems.28 A holding company is a corporation formed for the express purpose
of controlling other corporations by the ownership of a majority of their voting
capital. 29 Holding companies allow a group of investors to control a large share
22. See Paul L. Joskow, Douglas R. Bohi, & Frank M. Gollop, Regulatory Failure,
Regulatory Reform, and Structural Changes in the Electrical Power Industry, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIvITY: MICROECON. Vol. 1989 at 125, 128 (1989) (providing a history of
the electric power industry and discussing the importance of background historical knowledge).
23. See DOUGLAS W. HAWES, UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES § 2-2 (3d ed. 1987)
(providing a history of the Public Utility Act).
24. See Public Utility Act of 1935, tits. I & II, 49 Stat. 803 (setting forth the regulatory
regime).
25. See id. at tit. I (bestowing regulatory duties upon the SEC).
26. See id. at tit. II (amending the FPA to give the FERC additional jurisdiction).
27. See infra Part III.A (discussing the SEC's successful regulatory approach).
28. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 261-62 (3d ed. 2003)
(describing the history and development of PUHCA). PUHCA was intended to supplement, not
supplant, state regulation. See id. (discussing the established state regulatory system).
29. See WILLIAM MOSHER & FINLA CRAWFORD, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 322 (1933)
(defining the term "holding company"). At common law, a corporation could not own stock of
another corporation unless the ownership was in satisfaction of debt or a preliminary step to a
merger. See HAWES, supra note 23, § 2-3 (providing the history of development in the electric
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of the market with only a minimal investment of capital, thereby producing
gains for the principal investors. 30 During the early 1920s, investment bankers
and promoters encouraged holding company expansion to maximize profits,
commissions, and fees from sales in light of the surge of growth and
development in the electric utility industry. 3' Holding companies had the
ability to control several corporations for a common object, to perpetuate
corporate control, and to permit the capitalization of controlling stock interest.32
As the popularity of holding companies increased, so did the abuses.33
Promoters and bankers often used pyramidal capital and corporate structures in
order to create huge holding company systems.34 After forming these complex
structures, the organizers frequently inflated the value and assets of the
operating and holding companies.35 Large holding companies purchased other
holding companies and created a complex series of contracts that concentrated
voting control in the hands of a few shareholders. 36 These complex systems
energy field). It was not until 1888 that the New Jersey legislature first authorized corporations
to include in their charters the power to hold stock in other companies. Id.
30. See MOSHER & CRAWFORD, supra note 29, at 322-24 (enumerating the advantages of
holding companies and providing a full description of the mechanics of holding companies).
31. See HAWES, supra note 23, § 2-3 (supplying an overview of holding company
development). In the early 1900s, the electricity industry experienced a surge of growth and
development, and generating capacity approximately doubled every five years between 1902
and 1927. See SEC, Div. INV. MGMT., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC-UTILITY HOLDING
COMPANIES 11 at 2 (1995) [hereinafter SEC REPORT] (providing a history of the development of
electric utility holding companies).
32. See MOSHER& CRAWFORD, supra note 29, at 322-24 (describing the abuse ofholding
companies). For a full discussion of the advantageous uses of the holding company structure
and the methods of exploiting control, see id. at 322-50.
33. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON UTILITY CORPORATIONS, pt. 73-A, at 62, S. Doc.
No. 92, 70th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1928-1935 ) [hereinafter FTC REPORT] (documenting the holding
company abuses). In 1928, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), began a study into the
regulation and ownership of utilities and holding companies. Id. The documented abuses
included: issuance of securities to the public that were based on unsound asset values or on-
paper profits from intercompany transactions; mismanagement and exploitation of operating
subsidiaries of holding companies through excessive service charges; excessive common stock
dividends; upstream loans and an excessive portion of senior securities; and the use of the
holding company to evade state regulation. Id. Additionally, the House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee conducted a second study from 1933-35, which supported the findings
of the FTC study. See generally FOREIGN COMMERCE COMM. REPORT ON THE RELATION OF
HOLDING COMPANY IN POWER AND GAS AFFECTING CONTROL, H.R. Rep. No. 827, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1933-35) (documenting holding company abuses).
34. See5 LAW & SEC. REG. § 18.1 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing the use and abuse of holding
companies).
35. See id. (discussing the methods of abuses).
36. See David I. Bloom & Samantha Hampshire, What the PUHCA Repeal Means for
U.S. Utilities, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Sept. 2005, at 44, 45 (tracing the development of holding
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made it almost impossible for an investor to ascertain pertinent information
about the status of a holding company's operations.37
The real danger of holding companies became apparent in 1929.38
Holding companies used pyramiding, which allowed the controlling interests to
domineer a larger amount of business than would have been possible otherwise
with the capital at their disposal. 39 This structure allowed the holding company
to operate with a high debt ratio.40 The danger of this arrangement was a
serious financial risk to investors if these securities collapsed in value.4 1 In
1929, securities values plummeted, and many holding companies collapsed
because they could not service their high debt levels.42 The crash of 1929
exposed holding company abuses, caused investor confidence to plummet, and
led to an earnest push for regulation.43 The government studies concluded that,
"the only practical control over public-utility holding companies will be one
which can directly reach the holding company itself and supervise its security
structure and its use of capital."44 Congress responded by passing PUHCA to
protect investors from further holding company abuses.45
companies).
37. See HAWES, supra note 23, §§ 2-5-2-10 (providing a full history, description, and
flow charts to illustrate the power and control exercised by The Electric Bond & Share Group,
The Insull Group, and The United Corporation); Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, From Insull to
Enron, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 39-72 (2005) (illustrating the rise, and subsequent fall, of Sam
Insull, his company, and his legacy). Judge Cudahy notes that "the consolidation within the
industry was undeniably being driven by the efficiencies of superior management and better (but
costly) technology, the giant egos of these industry moguls no doubt played a part in stimulating
the sprawling growth of utility holding companies that defied all economic logic." Id. at 51.
The complex arrangements impeded an investor's ability to make informed investment choices.
Id.
38. See Cudahy, supra note 37, at 39-72 (2005) (describing the spectacular crash of the
Insull corporation and other holding companies when the values of securities dropped).
39. See MOSHER & CRAWFORD, supra note 29, at 323-24 (discussing pyramiding and the
dangers inherent in the practice).
40. See id. (describing the "benefits" of pyramiding).
41. See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY: ITS
PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE AND ITS REGULATION 1-54, 149-99 (1932) (providing a complete
discussion of the holding company structure and its advantages); see also MOSHER &
CRAWFORD, supra note 29, at 322-50 (same).
42. See FTC REPORT, supra note 33, at pt. 72-1,496-515 (discussing holding company
abuses).
43. See HAWES, supra note 23, § 2-14 (presenting the history of the pre-regulated
environment).
44. See SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 13-14 (describing the collective findings of all
studies conducted on holding company abuses).
45. See id. at 11-20 (providing an overview of PUHCA history and the purpose and
objectives of the Act).
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B. The FERC Protects the Ratepayers
Congress created the FERC in 1920, through the FPA.46 Most states had
independent regulatory commissions that regulated the public utilities, and the 1920
FPA gave the FERC limited authority to regulate rates, services, and securities.47
As electricity demand increased and the industry developed, new transmission
facilities made it possible to engage in interstate sales of wholesale power.48 State
utility commissions attempted to regulate interstate wholesale sales of power, but the
Supreme Court made it clear in Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v.
Attleboro Steam and Electric Company49 that state commissions could not regulate
interstate transactions. 50 Congress designed Title H1 to supplement, not supplant,
state regulation of public utility rates, services, and securities.5'
The Attleboro case provides a clear example of a state regulatory commission
attempting to regulate an interstate transaction.5 2 The Narragansett Electric Lighting
Company, a Rhode Island corporation producing electric current at its plant in
Providence, sold power to Attleboro Steam & Electric Company, a Massachusetts
corporation supplying electricity for public and private use in Massachusetts.53 In
1917, Attleboro entered into a twenty-year contract to buy power from Narragansett,
with the power delivered at the state line.54 In 1924, the Narragansett Company
applied to the Rhode Island Commission to obtain a new rate schedule, which
46. See PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 644-45 (discussing the birth of the Federal Power
Commission); see id. at 655 (discussing the Department of Energy's reorganization).
47. See id. at 646 (discussing the FPC's early regulatory duties).
48. See Joseph T. Kelliher, Market Manipulation, Market Power, and the Authority of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 26 ENERGY L.J. 1,5 (2005) (providing the history of
the FERC's regulatory duties).
49. See Pub. Util. Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 83
(1927) (finding that state utility commissions do not have the power to regulate interstate
commerce).
50. See id. at 83 ("The order.., places a direct burden upon interstate commerce ... from
which the State is restrained by the force of the Commerce Clause, [and] it must necessarily fall,
regardless of its purpose.").
51. See SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 22 (stating that many of the provisions of the FPA
are designed to supplement state jurisdiction). In the early years of electricity development,
plants were relatively small and there was no economical way to transmit power over any great
distance. See id. at 11 (describing energy utility expansion and PUHCA). State utility
commissions performed all manner of regulation. See PHiLLIPS, supra note 8, at 631 (discussing
the creation of a system of federal oversight of the electric utility industry through the 1935
Public Utility Act).
52. See Attleboro, 273 U.S. at 84 (explaining that the interstate transaction was beyond
the reach of the Rhode Island Utility Commission).
53. See id. (explaining the identity of the parties).
54. See id. (detailing the agreement for power delivery).
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would have allowed it to increase the rate for power sold to Attleboro.55 When the
Rhode Island Commission approved the increased rate Attleboro appealed.5 6 The
Supreme Court explained that, "the rate is therefore not subject to regulation by
either of the two States... but if such regulation is required it can only be attained
by the exercise of the power vested in Congress. 5 7 This decision created what
became known as the "Attleboro Gap. 58 Congress responded by amending the
FPA to close the regulatory gap and to implement a system of federal regulation to
protect ratepayers from the potential of excessive rates.59
Ill. Two Regulatory Personalities
The two titles of the 1935 Act emerged after a fight one historian described as
"the most bitter legislative battle of Roosevelt's first term. 60 Congress intended that
the two titles would work in tandem to create a solid foundation for federal
regulation and protect investors and ratepayers from further abuses. 61 The 1935 Act
gave both the SEC and the FERC a foundation on which to build a regulatory
structure, and it has been the foundation of the regulatory regime for the past
seventy years.
62
A. The SEC's Proactive and Comprehensive Approach
The first phase of PUHCA regulation began immediately after passage of the
Act and continued until the mid 1950S. 63 The SEC's duty was to restructure the
55. See id. (explaining the initial spark for the controversy).
56. See id. (noting the procedural posture).
57. Id. at 90.
58. See Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, 70th Anniversary Celebration of the Federal Power
Act, 26 ENERGY L.J. 389, 389 (2005) (providing an entertaining explanation of the Attleboro
Gap).
59. See SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 20 (noting that Congress passed Title II as a
response to the gap in state regulation created by Attleboro).
60. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 145 (1970); see
also SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 15-16 (describing the issues and compromises made in the
process of passing the Public Utility Act).
61. See SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 40 ("Consumers were not protected because the
states did not review the transactions, and the investors were harmed because they could not
obtain the information necessary to make an informed investment decision.").
62. See infra Part IV (discussing EPAct's repeal of PUHCA).
63. See SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 41 (describing the SEC's first phase of PUHCA
regulation).
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eighty-six existing electric utility holding companies that held aggregate assets
in excess of fourteen billion dollars.64 The SEC effectively accomplished its
mission of restructuring by the early 1950s, and thus only a few holding
companies were required to register.65 The second phase of PUHCA regulation
began in the 1950s, and the SEC shifted its focus from corporate reorganization
to oversight and approval of registered holding companies' transactions.66 The
second phase continued until Congress repealed PUHCA in EPAct 2005.67 An
analysis of the SEC's regulatory history will show that the SEC, in its PUHCA
administration, was a responsive agency and produced a stable and efficient
regulatory environment through its proactive and comprehensive regulatory
approach.68
1. The SEC Simplifies and Restructures Holding Companies
The 1935 Congress vested the newly established SEC with the duty of
restructuring the complex corporate structures of utility holding companies
because it was the agency most familiar with economic matters. 69 After
passage of the Securities Act in 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
it was a logical decision to vest economic regulations in the SEC.7 ° In its first
PUHCA decisions, the SEC established itself as a proactive, comprehensive,
and responsive body.71  The SEC's initial decisions were shaped by its
64. See 5 LAW & SEC. REG., supra note 34, § 18.1 (providing statistics to illustrate the
magnitude of the task the SEC was required to accomplish).
65. See id. (providing statistics which demonstrate the success of the Commission's
reorganization actions).
66. See SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 41-42 (describing PUHCA regulatory history as
two distinct phases).
67. See id. (describing PUHCA regulatory history as two distinct phases).
68. See infra Part III.A (discussing actions that illustrate the SEC's proactive and
comprehensive approach to regulation).
69. See SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 16 ("Congress entrusted the SEC, the agency with
expertise in financial transactions and corporate finance, with administration of the Holding
Company Act.").
70. See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 249 (describing the role and identity of the early
SEC).
71. See supra Part II.A (discussing the SEC's regulatory patterns that accounted for
social, historical, and political factors). The SEC took a comprehensive approach to regulation
by accounting for all influencing factors-political, social, and historical-and using that
information to formulate rules and regulations that would guide the industry. As a proactive
body the SEC responded to industry changes as soon as they arose and issued rules that would
provide stability and guidance during times of change. See supra Part II.A (discussing how the
SEC used rules and regulations to guide the industry through the new industry developments).
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awareness of the strong and bitter opposition to PUHCA and by the Judiciary's
general disapproval of New Deal legislation.72 The SEC's Section 11 decisions
best illustrate the regulatory approach of the agency. Section 11 was the "very
heart"73 of PUHCA, and it vested the SEC with the duty to simplify and
restructure the corporate organization of utility holding company systems.
74
The statute instructed the SEC to:
[E]xamine the corporate structure of every registered holding company and
subsidiary company thereof, the relationships among the companies in the
holding company system of every such company and the character of the
interests thereof... to determine the extent to which the corporate structure
of such holding-company system and the companies therein may be
simplified, unnecessary complexities therein eliminated, voting power fairly
and equitably distributed among the holders of securities thereof, and the
properties and business thereof confined to those necessary or appropriate
to the operations of an integrated public utility system.
75
To effectuate its duties, the statute provided the SEC with two potential
avenues of enforcement. Section 11 (d) allowed the SEC to design and institute
a divestiture plan for the holding company, which could be enforced through a
court order,76 and Section I I(e) allowed the SEC to accept a holding
company's voluntary divestiture proposal.77
This proactive and comprehensive approach provided regulatory certainty tailored to the needs
of a developing industry. See supra Part II.A (discussing the SEC's commitment to regulatory
certainty).
72. See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 249-51 (describing the political environment
immediately after passage of PUHCA). During this era, the Court viewed New Deal business
legislation unfavorably, and was not hesitant to strike down such legislation as an unnecessary
interference in capitalist markets. Id.
73. See SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 56 ("It is therefore the very heart of the title, the
section most essential to the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in the President's
message [recommending the legislation].").
74. See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 249 (describing the political situation surrounding
PUHCA and the SEC). Section 11 was also the most controversial section of the legislation,
and most in danger of being invalidated by the Court.
75. Public Utility Act of 1935, tit. I, § 11 (a), 49 Stat. 803.
76. See id. at tit. I, § 11 (d) ("The Commission may apply to a court.., to enforce
compliance with any order issued under subsection (b).").
77. See id. at tit. I, § 11 (e) (explaining the option of voluntary divestiture plans). The
statute reads:
In accordance with rules and regulations or order as the Commission may deem
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or
consumers, any registered holding company... may... submit a plan to the
Commission for the divestment of control, securities, or other assets or for other
action.., for the purpose of enabling such company... to comply with the
provisions of subsection (b).
1659
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The SEC recognized the danger of provoking a potentially disastrous court
battle should it utilize Section 11 (d), and so the SEC began regulation through
use of the "Fabian tactic, 7 8 to avoid giving the judiciary an opportunity to
strike down the legislation. 79 Rather than imposing mandatory divestiture plans
under Section 11 (d), the SEC instead accepted voluntary proposals under
Section 1l(e).8° While Section 1 l(d) would have allowed for strict divestiture
plans and immediate results, the danger ofjudicial invalidation, at the time, was
real.81 The SEC's decision in American Water Works and Electric Company
2
best illustrates the SEC's strategic approach.
American Water Works controlled an intermediate holding company
organized under the laws of Maryland, 83 and owned stocks in public utility and
holding companies whose electric operations extended over an area covering
portions of Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia.
84
Additionally, American Waters Works engaged in a number of other businesses
that were not within the PUHCA definition of a public utility.8 5 The SEC
approved American Water Work's voluntary divestiture proposal, even though
the proposal did not comport with the Section 11 simplification provisions.86
This proposal allowed American Water Works to retain its combined gas and
electric system, 87 continue its water and coal operations, 88 operate its
Id.
78. See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 250 (quoting then Public Utilities Division attorney
Roger Foster). The famous Roman general Quintus Fabius Maximus engaged Hannibal in a
long war of attrition during the Second Punic War. See ALLEN M. WARD, FRITZ M.
HEICHELHEIM & CEDRIC A. YEO, A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN PEOPLE 110 (4th ed. 2003) (detailing
Fabius' strategy of attrition).
79. See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 250 (explaining the influence of the judiciary on the
Commission's actions).
80. See id. (describing use of the Fabian tactic).
81. See id. ("[T]he SEC compromised enforcement of Section 11 in its early Section 11
cases to discourage appeals to the judiciary.").
82. See Am. Water Works & Elec. Co., 2 S.E.C. 972 (1937) (allowing a very generous
divestiture proposal).
83. See id. at 976 (providing a discussion of the origin of the American Water Works
holding company system).
84. See id. at 975 (explaining the extent of the American Water Works holding company
system).
85. See Public Utility Act of 1935, tit. I, § 2(a)(5), 49 Stat. 803 (defining public utility).
86. See id. at tit. I, § 11 (b) (providing the divestiture and simplification requirements for
public utilities).
87. SeeAm. Water Works, 2 S.E.C. at 975 (describing facilities that clearly should not be
part of an integrated facility, but nonetheless allowing their retention).
88. See id. at 984 (allowing the retention of businesses that were neither reasonably
incidental nor economically appropriate).
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transportation businesses,89 and retain its agricultural property for a reasonable
time. 90
Once the Supreme Court was filled with a majority of pro-New Deal
Justices, the SEC quickly informed parties that American Water Works was
nothing more than an "advisory opinion" and that it certainly did not amount to
a controlling principle. 91 While the Judiciary shifted to a pro-New Deal stance,
political support of PUHCA remained unstable.92 The 1940s saw bitter
opposition to PUHCA, and the SEC was aware that if it imposed even a single
divestiture plan that appeared to harm investors or consumers, it would risk
Congressional reexamination.93 Consequently, the SEC refined its regulatory
approach to respond to the changing situation.
The SEC took a comprehensive and proactive approach to the precarious
political situation and created the "Section 11 (e) strategy. 94 The key to this
strategy was doctrinal.95  Section 1 (b)(1) required that the operations of a
holding company system be limited to a "single integrated public utility system,
and to such other businesses as are reasonably incidental, or economically
necessary or appropriate to the operations of such integrated public utility
system. ' 96 Section I1 (b)(2) required that each holding company "shall take
such steps as the Commission shall find necessary to ensure that the corporate
structure or continued existence of any company in the holding company
system does not unduly or unnecessarily complicate the structure... of such
89. See id. (permitting retention of property, even though it was not necessary and
appropriate to proper functioning).
90. See id. (allowing additional time to dispose of agricultural property).
91. See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 250-51 (describing the ideological framework ofthe
Judiciary and the SEC's reaction to the shift to a pro-New Deal court); see also Columbia Gas &
Elec. Corp., 8 S.E.C. 460 (1941) (stating that American Water Works would be considered only
as an advisory opinion).
92. See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 251-53 (explaining the political situation
surrounding PUIHCA).
93. See id. (explaining the precarious political circumstances surrounding PUHCA
enforcement). The SEC knew that the controversial Section 11 had been approved by Congress
by only a single vote. Id. at 214. "The strategy of attrition is a naturally double-edged sword
and puts as hard a strain on the user as on the enemy." WARD, ET. AL., supra note 78, at 110.
While the SEC was still active, its strategy caused it to be classified as a "nonessential agency,"
the headquarters physically were transferred from Pennsylvania Avenue to Philadelphia, and
one third of its staff was furloughed for military service. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 214.
94. See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 252 (describing the commencement of the Section
1 l(e) strategy).
95. See id. (discussing the teeth of the Section 1 1(e) strategy).
96. See Public Utility Act of 1935, tit. I, § 1 l(b)(1), 49 Stat. 803 (providing geographical
limitations).
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holding company system. 97 In a series of decisions the SEC put holding
companies that submitted inappropriate Section 11 (e) proposals "through the
wringer. 9 8 The SEC's Section 11 (e) strategy strictly construed Sections
I1 (b)(1) and I1 (b)(2) to encourage utilities to offer appropriate voluntary
divestiture plans.99 The SEC made it clear that if a utility required it to perform
a Section 11 (d) proceeding, the Commission would issue as comprehensive a
divestiture order as was permissible under a reasonable interpretation of the
Act. 100
The SEC's North American Company decision' 0' provides a clear
example of the SEC's Section 11 (e) strategy. The North American Company
was a "pinnacle of a great pyramid of corporations... scattered throughout the
United States. 10 2 Its holding company system consisted of "some eighty
corporations... with an aggregate capitalized value in excess of
$2,300,000,000." 103 The companies in the North American system performed
"a variety of functions from electric and gas service to railroad transportation,
warehousing and amusement park operations."' 104 North American submitted a
voluntary divestiture plan that contemplated retention of the majority of its non-
integrated businesses. 105 The SEC construed Section 11 (b)(1) as permitting the
retention of an additional system only if it was located in the state in which the
principal system operated or in an adjoining state or country. 1°6 The SEC then
construed Section I1 (b)(2) to require divesture of holding or subholding
companies "which serve no useful purpose."' 1 7 The SEC then found that North
American had not confined its operations to "those of a single integrated public
97. See id. at tit. I, § 1 (b)(2) (providing geographical limitations).
98. See SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 74 (noting the SEC's strict construction of the
statutory requirements). For an example of a holding company that the SEC put through the
wringer, see American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
99. See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 252 (discussing the success of the SEC's Section 11
strategy).
100. See id. (describing the Commission's strategy to induce appropriate divestiture plans).
101. N. Am. Co., 11 S.E.C. 194 (1942) (issuing a strict divestiture plan for the North
American Company).
102. N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 690-91 (1946) (explaining the North American
Company's holding company system).
103. Id. at 691.
104. See id. (describing the structure of the North American holding company).
105. See N. Am. Co., 11 S.E.C. at 195 (providing the details of the North American
voluntary divestiture proposal).
106. See id. at 206-08 (articulating the SEC's narrow interpretation of the geographical
limitations of Section 11 (b)).
107. See id. (explaining the SEC's narrow interpretations of the 1 l(b) provisions).
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utility system within the meaning of the Act, and to such businesses as are
reasonably incidental, economically necessary, or appropriate to the operations
of such integrated public utility system.' 08 Consequently, the SEC issued an
extremely strict Section 1 (d) divestiture plan, and the Court upheld the
proposal. 0 9
The cumulative effect of the SEC's strict interpretation of Sections
11 (b)(1) and 11 (b)(2) motivated many holding companies to offer appropriate
voluntary divesture plans in hopes of avoiding such severe impositions under a
Section 11 (d) action.10 This Section 11 (e) strategy demonstrates the proactive
and comprehensive nature of the SEC's regulatory personality and shows how
such an approach produces industry compliance. This effective and efficient
regulatory approach was due largely to the enabling statute, which gave the
SEC the appropriate tools to create a stable regulatory environment.1" By
issuing a general order of what should be done, but allowing the utilities to
work out the details and methods of compliance, the SEC adhered to
Congressional goals while still giving the industry room to develop. 12 In
addition to the statutory influence, the success of the SEC is also attributable to
its members who planned and implemented such innovative strategies." 3 Most
members of the SEC can be classified as regulatory economists, and most
regulatory economists would agree that "regulation is like growing old: we
would rather not do it, but consider the alternative."' 14 This combination of
statutory and member influences created a principled SEC that produced a
stable, effective, and efficient regulatory regime.15
108. See id. at 197 (explaining its assessment of the North American Company).
109. N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 687 (1946) (upholding the SEC's divestiture
order).
110. See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 207 (describing the effects of the SEC's Section 11
approach).
111. See Public Utility Act of 1935, tit. 1, 49 Stat. 803 (giving the SEC the tools necessary
(1) to restructure the corporate functions of holding companies in Section 11 and (2) to provide
further regulation once its simplification duties were complete).
112. See HAWES, supra note 23, § 2-19 (arguing that the SEC developed its overall
approach during the initial phase of PUHCA regulation).
113. See generally SELIGMAN, supra note 28 (providing a full description and explanation
of all the SEC Chairmen).
114. See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, ALBERT L. DANIELSEN & DAVID R. KAMERSCHEN,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 18 (1988) (giving an economist's view of regulation).
115. See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 257 (noting that by 1948 holding companies had
voluntarily divested themselves of approximately $12 billion in assets and the number of
subsidiaries controlled by holding companies was reduced from 1,983 to 303); see also HAWES,
supra note 23, § 2-19 (noting that Congress did not intend utilities to remain permanent federal
wards of the Act, and that the reduction in companies subject to the Act was intended and
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2. A Stable and Efficient Regulatory Environment
By 1952, the SEC had completed over 90% of its restructuring mission,' "
6
and only a few holding companies registered with the SEC.' 17 In the second
phase of PUHCA regulation, the SEC shifted its focus to the duties of Sections
6.18 and 7,"19 which provided for SEC oversight of securities transactions by
registered holding companies and their subsidiaries; Sections 9120 and 10,21
which required the SEC to approve the acquisition of securities and utility
assets and other interests by registered holding companies and their
subsidiaries; and Sections 1222 and 13,123 which authorized the SEC to approve
affiliate transactions in a holding company system. 124 The SEC's regulatory
behavior in this second phase shows a commission committed to guiding the
industry into a new stage of development by issuing proactive rules and
regulations.
In the 1950s the industry shifted focus to the development of technological
advancements in engineering and power systems, and the SEC responded by
formulating and enforcing a number of policies and practices that would serve
as a guide in this new field. 25 The SEC's proactive regulations consisted of
adopting statements of policy regarding first mortgage bonds and preferred
reflects attainment of the Act's purpose).
116. See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 257 (describing the accomplishments of the
Commission); see also SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 5 (noting that the task of restructuring
was largely completed by 1952).
117. See James W. Moeller, Toward an SEC-FERC Memorandum of Understanding, 15
ENERGY L.J. 31, 69 n.30 (1993) (listing the remaining registered holding companies).
118. See Public Utility Act of 1935, tit. I, § 6,49 Stat. 803 (describing unlawful registered
holding company securities transactions).
119. See id. at tit. I, § 7 (listing mandatory declarations for registered holding companies in
securities transactions).
120. See id. at tit. I, § 9 (stating the restrictions on a registered holding company's
acquisitions of securities).
121. See id. at tit. I, § 10 (describing standards that guide the FERC in approving securities
transactions of registered holding companies).
122. See id. at tit. I, § 12 (prohibiting certain intercompany transactions).
123. See id. at tit. I, § 13 (describing standards for service, sales and construction contracts
of affiliated companies).
124. See SEC REPRT, supra note 31, at 59 (describing regulatory duties during the
"transmission period" after Section 11 enforcement).
125. See id. at 41 (noting that "electric power consumption in the United States doubled
every decade between 1935 and 1970, due to the increased development of household electric
appliances and other devices that increased consumption"); see also id. at 24 (commenting that
the increased electric power consumption required new technologies for its generation,
transmission, and distribution).
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stock,126 creating general standards for debt and equity as a percentage of total
capitalization, 27 and imposing limitations on the types of securities issued. 28
Further, the SEC issued comprehensive rules and regulations to account for
industry needs, investor and consumer concerns, and PUHCA's goals. Instead
of being shaped by the industry, the SEC's regulatory behavior effectively
shaped the industry.'
29
To accommodate the increased demand in electricity from 1965 to 1979
the industry shifted its focus to the construction of new facilities. 3 The SEC
responded to the industry changes by allowing the industry to issue
nontraditional securities, to depart from conventional financing rules, and to
use sale-leaseback transactions.1 31 Additionally, the SEC responded to new
industry developments by maintaining flexible regulations in new situations. 1
32
The SEC noted that "the determination of whether to permit enlargement of a
system by acquisition is to be made on the basis of all the circumstances, not on
the basis of preconceived notions of size."'133 The SEC adjusted its regulatory
decisions to account for the current changes in the industry, but also set forth
general rules and regulations that would continue to guide all registered holding
126. See id. at 42 (describing policy statements that outlined the various terms required to
be included in issues of such securities to satisfy the standards of Section 7(d)). These policy
statements included redemption provisions, dividend limitations, sinking and improvement fund
and renewal and replacement fund provisions, and other terms for bonds; and unsecured debt
limitations, voting rights, redemption provisions, and other terms for preferred stock. Id.
127. See id. (explaining the SEC's established requirements for balanced capitalization
ratios in order to maintain conservative capital structures that would tend to produce economies
in the cost of new capital).
128. See id. (discussing rules and polices used to deal with securities financings). In
general, electric-utility holding companies issued common stock, while their subsidiaries issued
preferred stock and first mortgage bonds to the public, and common stock to the parent
company. Id. Short-term borrowings were permitted as interim financing. Id.
129. See id. at 36-40 (explaining why the PUHCA provisions were redundant).
Additionally, all registered holding companies were reporting companies under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and the SEC regulated the public utility holding companies by virtue of
their status as issuers of securities. Id.
130. See SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 85 (discussing the SEC's second phase of
regulation).
131. See id. at 43-44 (describing in detail the flexible interpretations offered by the SEC).
132. See id. at 60 (noting that companies which sought SEC approval for joint ownership
of large generating facilities met an accommodating commission); see also Am. Elec. Pwr. Co.,
46 S.E.C. 1299 (1978) (approving an acquisition that, in 1946, the SEC would have judged to
be too large).
133. Am. Elec. Pwr. Co., 46 S.E.C. at 1309 (explaining the SEC's flexible interpretation of
the PUHCA provisions, specifically regarding permissible holding company size).
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companies in their future dealings, thus facilitating a consistent and stable
regulatory environment. 134
The SEC's effective regulation of PUHCA, the Securities Act, and the
Securities Exchange Act made many PUHCA provisions redundant and
burdensome. 35 Beginning in the early 1980s, the SEC began advocating for
the repeal of PUHCA. 136 Most of PUHCA's transactions were also under the
SEC's jurisdiction in its role as securities regulator.' 37 Securities statutes use
disclosure to facilitate the dissemination of full and accurate information, but
PUHCA required the SEC to conduct an additional merit review of the
transaction. 138 In 1995 the SEC presented a clear and cogent proposal for
PUHCA repeal in a comprehensive report. 13 9 This report illustrates, once
again, the proactive and comprehensive regulatory approach of the SEC.
Instead of revamping PUHCA through creative interpretation, the SEC called
for Congressional action. 140  The 109th Congress finally acted on the
recommendation and repealed PUHCA, divesting the SEC of its electric
regulatory duties and establishing the FERC as the sole electric utility
regulatory commission.14
The SEC's PUHCA regulatory history demonstrates that a proactive and
comprehensive approach to regulation can shape and direct, rather than confine,
industry development. Predictability favors investors and consumers by
allowing regulated utilities to plan and price transactions on the front end,
which can lead to efficient corporate functions, that can help encourage
industry advancements. A volatile regulatory environment might have hindered
134. See, e.g., Transactions Limited to Cost, 17 C.F.R. § 250.90 (2005) (permitting
transactions between and among affiliates so long as the holding company complied with the
SEC's at-cost standard); Determinations of Cost, 17 C.F.R. § 250.91 (2005) (setting standards
for use of the "at cost" pricing standard for affiliate transactions); Sales of Goods Produced by
Seller, 17 C.F.R. § 250.92 (2005) (same).
135. See SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 7 ("Since 1935, developments in other regulation
have made the SEC's merit review increasingly redundant.").
136. See Hearings on S. 1869, S. 1870, S. 1871 andS. 1977 toAmendorRepealthePublic
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 407 (1982) (discussing the repeal of PUHCA).
137. See SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 107 (describing the redundant PUHCA
provisions).
138. See id. at 115 ("While those statutes generally focus on disclosure... the Holding
Company Act requires the SEC to evaluate the merits of securities issuances.").
139. See id. at 6 (suggesting that the best solution would be for Congress to issue a
conditional repeal of PUHCA).
140. See id. (providing potential plans of action if Congress did not repeal PUHCA).
141. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 1263-89, 119 Stat. 594
(providing for a new regulatory regime).
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the companies' ability to seize opportunities for growth and development, ultimately
harming investors and consumers in a manner that would have been antithetical to the
goals of PUHCA. The SEC's regulatory personality and the resulting regulatory
environment ensured that both investors and consumers received the benefits of a
stable and efficient industry.
B. The FERC Produces an Unstable and Inefficient Regulatory Environment
For the past seventy years, the FERC and the SEC have continued on parallel
tracks of regulation, each guided by distinct regulatory principles. Whereas the SEC
was a predictable and proactive body, the FERC has been a reactive body with
fragmented policies. 142 President George W. Bush promised that EPAct 2005 would
"help every American who drives to work, every family that pays a power bill, and
every small business owner hoping to expand."'143 This promise presumes great
developments in the energy industry, and a stable and effective regulatory environment
is one step toward achieving such industry advancements.' 44 The 109th Congress
established the FERC as the sole electric utility regulatory commission, and ifthe goals
of EPAct 2005 are to be achieved the FERC should aim to produce a stable and
efficient regulatory environment reminiscent of the SEC's.
1. The FERC Conducts Individualized Examinations
The 74th Congress amended the FPA to give the FERC regulatory jurisdiction
over a very small portion of the electric utility industry. 145 FERC's authority was
142. See, e.g., Kelliher, supra note 48, at 15 (discussing the role of the FERC). In the
securities industry disclosure of material information is the key to informed decision-making
and allows securities transactions to remain free from price regulation. See Reply Comments of
Edison Electric Institute at 9-10, Docket No. RM06-3 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Nov. 17,
2005), http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/File list. asp?documentid=4360333 (last visited Nov. 13,
2006) (arguing for the repeal of PUHCA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
In contrast, the electricity industry has its foundation in, and critical infrastructure has been
financed upon, the concept of extensive regulation based upon private contractual undertakings
that must receive regulatory approval before they can become effective. See Kelliher, supra
note 48, at 15 (giving the regulatory history).
143. Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Signs Energy Policy Act at the
Sandia National Laboratory (Aug. 8, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/08/20050808-6.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
144. See supra Part III.A (explaining how the SEC's stable and predictable regulatory
environment facilitated industry growth during the phases of industry development).
145. See supra Part II.B (describing the "Attleboro gap").
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limited to such actions as regulating rates and related terms and conditions for
interstate wholesale transactions, establishing a uniform system of accounts,
and approving mergers of electric utilities.146 "Price regulation is the heart of
public utility regulation," 47 and the FERC's regulatory history shows that it is a
results driven commission. A private operator who chooses to perform a
function clothed in the public interest enters into the regulatory compact, which
entitles him to receive a reasonable rate of return in exchange for providing
reliable service.148 Rate regulation ensures that the utilities make a profit but
limits that profit to a reasonable amount. 149 In 1935, when the FERC began its
regulation of electric utilities, the FERC was rightfully concerned that utilities
were trying to pass through maximum rates. 50 Negative public perception,
combined with the utilities' opposition to rate regulation, created an adversarial
tension between the FERC and the industry. This tension formed the roots of
the FERC's regulatory approach.
The FERC modeled its electric utility regulatory duties off of its prior
experience regulating the water and gas industries. The 1935 Act instructed the
FERC to ensure that rates were "just and reasonable.' 5 1 This vague delegation
gave the FERC the discretion to set rates in the "zone of reasonableness,"
which is "bounded at one end by the investor interest against confiscation and
at the other by the consumer interest against exorbitant rates."1 52 Not wanting
146. See supra Part II.B (describing the 1935 amendments to the FPA).
147. 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 20 (1970). Traditionally, it was
presumed that the primary purpose of regulation was, ostensibly at least, the promotion of the
public interest through the protection of consumers against exploitation. See Smyth v. Ames,
169 U.S. 466 (1897) (noting that this proposition has been accepted without objection as an
essential element in the law of property). This theory is more often assumed than articulated.
See Richard Posner, Economic Theories ofRegulation, THE BELLJ. OF ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 336,
336-40 (1974) (discussing the public interest theory and potential reforms). The public interest
theory of regulation starts from the uncontroversial normative proposition that regulation should
occur when necessary to address a market failure such as a natural monopoly. See id. at 336
(discussing the roots of the public interest theory). The theory arose out of two assumptions:
that economic markets are extremely fragile and prone to operate inefficiently or inequitably if
left alone and that government regulation is virtually costless. Id.
148. See PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 631 (describing the concept of regulatory compact).
149. Id. (explaining the meaning of the regulatory compact).
150. See supra Part II.A (discussing documented holding company abuses).
151. See Public Utility Act of 1935, tit. II, §§ 205-06,49 Stat. 803 (requiring the FERC to
determine if the proposed rates were just and reasonable and giving it the power to set the rates
if it determined the proposed rates were not just and reasonable). A court would overturn a rate
order only if the FERC's determination was arbitrary. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S.
591, 628 (1944) (giving great deference to the FERC's findings).
152. See Jersey Cent. Pwr. & Light v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(explaining the zone of reasonableness).
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to be a rubber stamp on industry proposed rates, the FERC inquired into the
particularities of each rate application.153 The early ratemaking decisions
illustrate the FERC's driving principle, expressed throughout its water, gas, and
electric utility regulatory decisions, that ratepayers are best protected when rates
are as low as possible.
In Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Company v. Public Service
Commission of West Virginia,154 the Court presented a lengthy list of factors
that the FERC should consider in determining the fair rate of return but left the
particular methods of calculation to the FERC.15 5 The factors included:
comparisons with other companies having corresponding risks, the attraction of
capital, current financial and economic conditions, the cost of capital, the risks
of the enterprise, the financial policy, the capital structure of the utility, the
competence of management, and the company's financial history. 56 After
Bluefield, the FERC conducted individualized examinations that attributed
varying weights to the above factors and found reasonable a 7% rate of
return,' 57 a 6.5% rate of return,' 58 and a rate of return as low as 6%.' 59 The
ensuing years created a guessing game between the utility and the FERC as to
what would be approved as a reasonable rate of return.16
0
Dissatisfied with the FERC's varying determinations, and in hopes of
requiring the FERC to set a clear standard for a reasonable rate of return, Hope
Natural Gas filed suit against the FERC. In Federal Power Commission v.
Hope Natural Gas, 161 the Court noted that:
153. See KAHN, supra note 147, at 26 (describing the supervision and control of operating
costs and capital outlays). To analyze rate applications, the FERC had to require the companies
to keep uniform systems of accounts, according to Commission issued procedures and subject to
the Commission's review. Id.
154. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W.Va., 262
U.S. 679 (1923).
155. Id. at 679.
156. Id.; see also PHILLIPs, supra note 8, at 377 (describing the Bluefield factors).
157. See McCardle v. Indianapolis Water, 272 U.S. 400,419 (1926) (finding that a 7% rate
of return was reasonable).
158. See Dayton Pwr. & Light v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 393 U.S. 290,311 (1934)
(finding a 6.5% rate of return reasonable).
159. See Driscoll v. Edison Pwr. & Light, 307 U.S. 104, 120 (1939) (finding a 6% rate of
return reasonable).
160. See KAHN, supra note 147, at 42-43 (discussing the issues involved in rate setting).
The zone of reasonableness is a compromise, or bargain, between the investors' and consumers'
interests. Id. Rate regulation "has to steer between Scylla and Charybdis." Cedar Rapids Gas
Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. 655, 669 (1912).
161. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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The Commission [is] not bound to the use of any single formula.., in
determining rates .... And when the Commission's order is challenged in
the courts, the question is whether the order "viewed in its entirety" meets
the requirements of the Act. Under the statutory standard of "just and
reasonable" it is the result reached and not the method employed which is
controlling. It is not the theory, but the impact of the rate order which
counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and
unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end.1
62
Justice Douglas went on to say that "[r]ates which enable the company to
operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to
compensate its investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned
as invalid, even though they might produce only a meager return. 1 63 The
Court's decision in Hope reaffirmed the FERC's broad discretion in its
regulatory duties.16 4 After Hope, the FERC continued its pattern of individual
examination and scrutinization of all factors to ensure that each rate passed on
only minimal costs to the ratepayer.1
65
The FERC's early approach to rate regulation illustrates the roots of the
FERC's regulatory personality. The tension between the FERC and the
industry, combined with the FERC's commitment to ratepayer protection,
spurred its use of in-depth, individualized examinations. 166 Prior to the early
1960s, the FERC's "function of regulating interstate wholesale electric rates
[had] not received the attention it deserved."' 67 The FERC's avoidance of
guiding rules, and its emphasis on individual examination, produced an
unstable and inefficient regulatory environment. The consequences of the
162. Id. at 602.
163. Id. at 605.
164. See id. (giving the FERC broad discretion in its methods used to calculate the rate
base and a reasonable rate of return).
165. See KAHN, supra note 147, at 40-54 (discussing the difficulties in setting a standard
rate of return).
166. Instead of adopting a presumptively reasonable rate of return, the Commission
continually altered its methods of calculation and evaluation to account for new issues. See,
e.g., Driscoll v. Edison Pwr. & Light, 307 U.S. 104, 120 (1939) (setting the rate ofreturn at 6%,
after approving 6.5% for Dayton Power and Light). Adoption of a presumptively reasonable
rate would have likely produced a stable and effective regulatory environment akin to that of the
SEC under PUHCA. See discussion supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the power of standardized
rules to produce a stable regulatory environment).
167. PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 648. The effects of the FERC's approach were largely
unrealized because a sophisticated transmission system had yet to develop. Id. With the power
to regulate only a few interstate wholesale transactions, the FERC's influence on the electric
field was relatively limited. See id. at 655 (describing the reorganization of the Department of
Energy, and noting the FERC's increased involvement in the federal regulation of electricity).
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FERC's reactive and fragmented approach were not felt until the FERC's role
in electricity regulation increased.1
68
2. The FERC Shifts to Market Regulation
The FERC's role and influence in electricity regulation greatly increased
in the 1970s due to a reorganization in the Department of Energy, high energy
prices, and new legislation. 169 The increased energy demands of the 1970s
were met by the industry's construction of new facilities, strengthened
interconnection of the transmission grid, and developments of new sources of
energy.'70  The strengthened transmission grid increased the potential for
interstate transactions, and the FERC experienced an increased role in electric
utility regulation.' 7' Additionally, a competitive generation market began
emerging after Congress passed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA). 72 PURPA was the Congressional response to high energy prices
due to the oil and natural gas shortage, and was intended to further the United
States' energy self-sufficiency. 73 PURPA's ancillary result was the emergence
of a competitive generation market.1
74
Traditionally, the FERC used a cost-of-service standard to evaluate a
utility's proposed rate.175 This method was consistent with the FERC's role of
protecting ratepayers by setting individual rates. 76 However, the development
168. See id. at 655 (discussing the significance of the FERC's increased role in electric
utility regulation).
169. See id. (describing the reorganization of the Department of Energy and noting the
FERC's increased involvement in the federal regulation of electricity).
170. See SEC REPORT, supra note 31, at 41 (describing the industry construction phase and
the development of the transmission system).
171. See id. (describing the increased development of the transmission system and industry
developments that resulted from the use of the transmission system).
172. See PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 661 (describing the industry at a crossroads); see also
Hon. Richard Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and Regulatory Policy, 16
ENERGY L.J. 419, 421 (1995) (describing the Congressional goals embodied in PURPA and the
development of a competitive generation market).
173. See Cudahy, supra note 172, at 422 (describing the role and effects of PURPA).
174. See id. (discussing the emergence of a competitive generation market after the passage
of PURPA). Additionally, PURPA helped to solve the problems created by the utilities' failed
construction of generation plants. See id. (describing the benefits of PURPA). Transmission
was still monopoly controlled, and a lack of open access transmission would have impeded the
feasibility of purchases from the increased number of Qualifying Facilities (QF). See PHILLIPS,
supra note 8, at 655-56 (summarizing PURPA).
175. See Kelliher, supra note 48, at 2 (describing traditional cost-of-service ratemaking).
176. See id. ("Under traditional cost-of-service rate regulation, the accumulation of
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of a generation market shifted the FERC's role from rate regulation to market
regulation, and a cost-of-service test was not well suited to the FERC's new
role. 177 A competitive generation market allowed utilities to sell and buy
electricity at market-based rates.178 The FERC's reactions to industry changes,
particularly its treatment of market-based rates, shows a reactive agency
judging the needs of a new and developing industry under a rigid template
formed by old standards. 1
79
Ocean State Power Company was the first utility to gain market-based rate
approval.1 80 Ocean State proposed four power sales at market-based rates-
three to non-affiliates and one to an affiliate.181 The FERC approved the three
non-affiliated proposed transactions based on the existence of a competitive
market, but required Ocean State to pass further tests to transact with an
affiliate at market-based rates.8 2 The FERC, expressing its commitment to
ratepayer protection, noted that:
When a purchaser is affiliated with a seller, the purchaser might agree to
pay a higher price than it would otherwise agree to pay because the
purchaser would financially profit from the transaction. To prevent inflated
rates that might result from the affiliate relationship, we must review the
rates to the affiliated purchasers to evaluate whether there is any indication
of abuse due to self-dealing.'
83
generation market power is a lesser concern, since the exercise of market power can be
controlled by setting individual rates.").
177. See id. at I ("As the industry has changed, the FERC's role has evolved from setting
rates for individual sellers to setting rules of general application that govern electricity
markets."); see also id. at 8 (discussing the FERC's development and treatment of market-based
rates).
178. See, e.g., Ocean State Pwr., 44 F.E.R.C. 61,261, 61,976 (1988) (applying to the
FERC for market-based rates).
179. See PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 861-98 (providing an appraisal of regulation). Equally
applicable to FERC's history is the observation that "[r]egrettably one searches in vain for an
unambiguous pronouncement of general policy with respect to the various measures... the
reading of decisions creates the impression that the FERC selects whichever theory appears best
to fit the case at hand." See C.H. FULDA, COMPETMON IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES:
TRANSPORTATION 370 (1961) (comparing the unpredictable regulatory decisions of the FERC
with the unpredictable nature of the Interstate Commerce Commission's).
180. See Ocean State, 44 F.E.R.C. at 61,985 (1988) (approving the first proposal for
affiliates to transact at market-based rates).
181. See id. at 61,977 (describing the proposed transactions).
182. See id. at 61,978 (noting that proof of an arms length transaction would be sufficient
to establish the existence of a competitive market for affiliate transactions).
183. Id. at 61,983.
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The FERC employed a comparable market test to judge the affiliated
transaction. I8 4 The FERC noted that it would:
Compare the rates paid by the affiliated purchasers to (1) the rates that the
affiliated purchasers would pay to other suppliers for similar service, and
(2) the rates that non-affiliated purchasers pay to the same source for
similar service .... The FERC will also consider the terms and conditions
of service to the affiliated purchasers when evaluating whether self-dealing
resulted in the choice of a less favorable deal.
8 5
Ocean State was the only utility to gain approval so easily to transact at market-
based rates.
The FERC's skepticism of the industry runs deep, and an increase in
market-based rate applications spurred the FERC to reevaluate its standard.
8 6
In Edgar Energy,"7 the FERC noted that "it is essential that the ratepayers be
protected and the transactions be above suspicion, and the critical first step is to
ensure lack of abusive self dealing."' s88 The FERC explained that "market-
based rates for sales involving affiliates will be found to violate § 205(a) of the
FPA unless there is a clear showing of lack of potential affiliate abuse."' 9 To
negate affiliate abuse, the utility should present:
(1) evidence of direct head-to-head competition between the affiliate and
competing unaffiliated suppliers in a formal solicitation or informal
negotiation process; (2) evidence of the prices non-affiliated buyers were
willing to pay for similar services from the affiliate; or (3) benchmark
evidence that shows the prices, terms, and conditions of sales made by non-
affiliated sellers.' 90
The FERC explained that the affiliate abuse test would ensure the solicitation
negotiation was designed and implemented without undue preference for the
affiliate, the analysis of the bids or responses did not favor the affiliate, and the
affiliate was selected based on some reasonable combination of price and
nonprice factors. 191
184. See id. (explaining the comparable market test).
185. Id.
186. See discussion supra Part III.B. 1 (discussing the FERC's regulatory roots and how
early circumstances made the FERC skeptical of the industry).
187. See Boston Edison Co. (Edgar Energy), 55 F.E.R.C. T 61,382,62,161(1991) (setting
forth the requirements for the affiliate abuse test).
188. Id. at 62,167.
189. Id.
190. Id. at62,168.
191. See id. (discussing the need for additional standards in proposed transactions between
affiliates).
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Skeptical of the industry, the FERC was also concerned that a seller with
market power could manipulate the market and influence the market price by
restricting supply or denying access to alternative sellers. 92 In addition to
negating the potential for affiliate abuse, a utility had to negate market power
by showing that neither it nor any of its affiliates:
(1) is a dominant firm in the sale of generation in the relevant market;
(2) owns or controls transmission facilities through which the buyer could
reach alternative sellers (or, if the seller or any of its affiliates does own
such facilities, they have adequately mitigated their ability to block the
buyer from reaching other sellers); and (3) can erect or control any other
barrier to market entry.'
93
Edgar required utilities to negate both market power and affiliate abuse in order
to gain market-based rate approval. 194
The FERC utilized these tests to protect ratepayers from excessive pricing
and to prevent abusive cross-subsidies. This pattern of regulation proves the
FERC's propensity to regulate in the "interest of the public alone, and not the
public utilities as well."'195 As an independent generation market continued to
grow, power marketers emerged. These marketers sold at market-based rates
either from merchant generation power plants or by buying power on the open
market and reselling it.1 96 When power marketers applied to the FERC for
approval to sell power at market-based rates, the FERC reacted to the new
situation by imposing a series of complex and cumbersome tests. 
97
Driven by ratepayer protection, the FERC was concerned that excessive
prices would be flowed through to the ratepayer.198 To address this concern the
FERC required power marketers to negate the existence of both generation and
192. See Commonwealth Atlantic Ltd. P'ship, 51 F.E.R.C. 61,368, 62,244 (discussing
FERC's concerns about abusive self-dealing).
193. Edgar Energy, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,382, 62,167 (1991).
194. See id. at 62,170 (setting forth the standards the FERC would employ when evaluating
a market-based rate application).
195. See Moeller, supra note 117, at 37 (discussing the different legal standards of the SEC
and the FERC).
196. See PHILLPS, supra note 8, at 657-61 (describing the provisions of the Energy Policy
Act of 1992 and their effects). The FERC permitted utilities to own and operate EWG's, so
long as the utility filed a sworn statement that it would comply with the statutory requirements.
Id.
197. See Heartland Energy Serv., 68 F.E.R.C. 61,223, 62,052 (1994) (establishing two
separate tests, one for an unaffiliated power marketer, and a second higher standard that an
affiliated power marketer must satisfy).
198. See id. at 62,062 (explaining the FERC's concerns about affiliate abuse).
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transmission market power.' 99 A number of non-affiliated power marketers
easily passed the market power tests, but the FERC expressed additional
concerns about the potential for cross-subsidization when a power marketer was
affiliated with a public utility.20 0  For an affiliated power market to gain
approval to sell at market-based rates to non-affiliated third party customers the
marketer had to show that neither it, nor any of its affiliates, possessed market
power.20'
Heartland Energy Services, a power marketer affiliated with Wisconsin
Power & Light (WP&L), was the first affiliated power marketer to apply to the
FERC for market-based rate approval.20 2  Heartland was separate, both
operationally and administratively, from WP&L, yet the FERC still focused on
both the generation and transmission market power of WP&L.2 °3 The FERC
would not approve an affiliated power marketer's proposal for market-based
rates unless the affiliated public utility also lacked generation and transmission
market power. 204 Lack of generation dominance is demonstrated by:
199. See id. at 62,063 (applying general standards to Heartland's proposal).
200. See id. at 62,064 (explaining additional standards to protect ratepayers from affiliate
abuse). A number of utilities sought to develop a power marketing function which would
combine a number of attributes. Interview with Al Carr, Adjunct Professor of Law, Wash. &
Lee School of Law, in Lexington, Va. (Mar. 5, 2006) (discussing the history of power marketers
and the FERC's treatment of power marketers transacting at market-based rates with their
affiliated utilities). Those marketers could sell and purchase power at market-based rates, both
from the market at large and independent generating plants; they could develop merchant power
plants and sell from them at market-based rates; and they could sell to third parties and sell and
trade power among themselves. Id.
201. See Heartland, 68 F.E.R.C. at 62,060 (explaining the tests an affiliated power
marketer would have to satisfy).
202. See id. at 62,052 (describing the characteristics of Heartland). Heartland was a power
broker, and did not itself own any generation or transmission facilities. Id. Heartland sought
authority to make market-based sales, but pledged not to engage in any transactions with its
affiliated utility. See id at 62,056 (describing Heartland's proposal, which included a pledge
not to transact with WP&L).
203. See id. at 62,052 (describing Heartland's proposal).
204. See id. at 62,062 (describing the steps necessary to mitigate transmission power).
Market power in transmission arises when sellers can block the buyer from reaching competing
suppliers. See Ocean State Pwr. II, 69 F.E.R.C. 61,035 (1994) (explaining the role of open
access transmission). An open access transmission tariff that is not unduly discriminatory or
anticompetitive should offer third parties access on the same or comparable basis, and under the
same or comparable terms and conditions, as the transmission provider's uses of its system. See
Kansas City Pwr. & Light Co., 67 F.E.R.C. 61,557 (1994) (discussing open access
transmission requirements). For a clear explanation of the value of an open access transmission
tariff, see Hermiston Generating Co., 69 F.E.R.C. 61,035 (1994). The FERC explained that
the only way to be sure that PG&E could not exercise transmission market power over a
Hermiston competitor is if PG&E had an open access tariff on file with the FERC to provide
comparable transmission service under specific rates, terms, and conditions. Id. The FERC
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(1) Showing that the entire output of a generating unit is committed
under long-term contract with non-affiliates; (2) showing that its
affiliates already are authorized to sell at market-based rates; or
(3) submitting a market analysis that indicates that its affiliates have no
generation dominance in the relevant markets.2 °5
An affiliated power marketer would not pass the FERC's market power
tests unless its affiliated utility had on file an open access transmission
tariff.20 6 The FERC also required affiliated power marketers to file a code
of conduct to protect against cross-subsidization.2 7 The code of conduct
prevented the power marketer from transacting with its affiliate, unless the
marketer made a separate § 205 rate filing for the proposed affiliated
20transaction. ° The complexity of these tests, and the intricate nature of the
individual examination, show how the FERC's regulatory behavior
impeded industry functions.
The FERC feared that market conditions would subvert its
commitment to protecting ratepayers. In order to prevent affiliates from
exploiting market conditions the FERC imposed complex tests, as
demonstrated by Heartland, that consequently impeded industry functions.
Heartland made it clear that gaining approval for market-based rates would
not be easy, and it was not until ten years later that a utility proposed a sale
from a power marketer to its affiliated public utility.20 9  In Southern
stated that it would apply such a requirement in the future in any situation in which a seller
seeking market-based rates was affiliated with an owner or controller of transmission facilities.
Id.
205. Heartland, 68 F.E.R.C. 61,223, 62,063 (1994).
206. See, e.g., Hermiston Generating, 69 F.E.R.C. at 61,160 (stating that the seller's
affiliate must have on file an open-access transmission tariff). Prior to Order 888, which
standardized transmission tariffs, the FERC analyzed the tariff to assure that the affiliate did not
possess transmission market power. See id. at 61,162 (explaining reasons for requiring open-
access transmission).
207. See Heartland, 68 F.E.R.C. at 62,062 (describing the FERC's affiliate abuse
concerns).
208. See id. (requiring separate § 205 filings for transactions between affiliates). The
FERC also imposed stringent reporting requirements if the market-based contract was for more
than one year. See Intercoast Pwr. Mktg. Co., 68 F.E.R.C. 61,248 (1994) (explaining the
reporting requirements). The FERC used the stringent reporting requirements "to evaluate the
reasonableness of the charges and to provide for ongoing monitoring of the marketer's ability to
exercise market power." Id. at 62,134.
209. See S. Ca. Edison Co., 109 F.E.R.C. 61,086 (2004) (proposing power sale to an
affiliate). It is important to note that it was not until after the California power crisis that
utilities took the step to approach the FERC with the proposal for the affiliated transaction. For
a salient discussion regarding the California energy crisis and the limits of state regulation, see
Norman A. Pederson, Power Play, Los ANGELES LAWYER (Apr. 2002). For a complete
discussion of the market-regulatory issues raised by the California power crisis and the Enron
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California Edison,21 ° the FERC reacted by extending Edgar to all long-term (one
year or more) power purchase agreements between affiliates, whether cost-based
or market-based. 21' The FERC noted that market factors made it possible to
purchase power at a market-based rate that was lower than the cost of service.21 2
The FERC was skeptical, and expressed concern that a utility would purchase
power from its affiliate at a cost-of-service price, that was higher than the market-
based rate, and flow through the increased cost to the ratepayer.213 The FERC
noted that it was "concerned about recent trends in energy markets, and [would
now] require additional scrutiny and a greater degree of certainty that affiliate
transactions will not cause long-term harm to wholesale competitive markets. '21
The FERC continued its practice of using complex and individualized tests to
guard against the potential of abusive self-dealing.
The FERC's rhetoric recognized its new role as market regulator, but the
FERC failed to alter its behavior to comport with its new role. The inefficiency of
the FERC's practice of using complex tests and in-depth examinations is
demonstrated in the 2005 Commonwealth Edison decision. 21 5 Before Exelon
Generation (ExGen) could sell power to its affiliated utility, Commonwealth
Edison (ComEd), it first had to satisfy all of the FERC's market-based rate
tests. 216 ComEd's § 205 proposal presented evidence to negate the presence of
scandal, see Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise
and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 Hous. Bus. & TAx. L.J. 1 (2004).
210. See S. Ca. Edison Co., 109 F.E.R.C. 61,086 (2004) (extending Edgar to all long-
term power purchase agreements).
211. See id. at 61,350 (permitting a power marketer to transact at market-based rates with
its affiliated public utility).
212. See id. (extending Edgar to protect against affiliate abuse of market conditions).
213. See id. at 61,355 (explaining the potential for ratepayer exploitation).
214. Id.; cf Transactions Limited to Cost, 17 C.F.R. § 250.90 (2005) (setting standards for
use of the "at cost" pricing standard for affiliate transactions); Determinations of Cost, 17 C.F.R.
§ 250.91 (2005) (same); Sales of Goods Produced by Seller, 17 C.F.R. § 250.92 (2005) (same).
The SEC, in its market regulation role, utilized clear rules and regulations to facilitate efficient
and effective regulations for affiliate transactions in registered holding companies.
215. See Commonwealth Edison, 113 F.E.R.C. 61,278 (2005) (permitting the affiliated
transaction only after the utility and the power marketer passed a series of complex tests).
216. See Commonwealth Edison, 113 F.E.R.C. at 62,117 (discussing the factors the utility
and power market had to satisfy in order to gain the Commission's approval). InAllegheny, the
FERC redefined Edgar once more. See Allegheny Energy Supply Co., 108 F.E.R.C. 61,082
(2004) (articulating further tests a utility must satisfy to earn the privilege of transacting at
market-based rates). The FERC set forth four guidelines it would use to evaluate the
competitive solicitation process in a proposed affiliate transaction. Id. at 61,417. The
competitive solicitation process must be transparent, precisely defined, negotiated by
standardized evaluation criteria, and the FERC will also consider whether the applicant
employed a third party to oversee the transaction. Id.
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market, generation, and transmission power, and also presented evidence to show
that there was no potential for affiliate abuse in its proposed bid solicitation
plan.217  The FERC conducted a thorough examination of all factors and
procedures in the CornEd and ExGen proposal, and only after closely scrutinizing
218the proposed bid solicitation did the FERC approve ExGen's participation.
This regulatory approach required CornEd to do significant amounts of work on
the front end, without any assurance that its proposal would comport with the
FERC's broad principles. 219 Had the FERC denied ComEd's proposal, all the
legal and corporate work to set up the proposed power purchase would have been
for naught. The vague and subjective nature of the tests, combined with intricate
individual examinations, show an inefficient regulatory style that does not
facilitate industry development.
220
The FERC's market-based rate decisions illustrate the unpredictable and
unstable regulatory environment. An unpredictable regulatory environment is
antithetical to efficient regulation. Deep seeded industry skepticism and fear of
affiliates exploiting market conditions are the roots of the FERC's regulatory
personality. The FERC's practice of regulating through individualized decisions
and utilizing vague standards has prevented any degree of regulatory certainty.
IV EPAct 2005 Reformulates the Regulatory Regime
EPAct 2005 vests the FERC with complete regulatory jurisdiction over the
electric utility industry and presents the opportunity for the birth of a new agency
217. See Commonwealth Edison, 113 F.E.R.C. at 62,118-62,119 (supplying evidence that
the utility's bidding process is in accord with the FERC's tests). The FERC found that the
competitive solicitation process was transparent and did not give an undue preference or
discriminate in favor of ExGen. Id. at 62,118. CornEd employed a third party to oversee the
bid process and set forth detailed requirements for bid qualification to ensure that bids were
evaluated on a price basis only. Id. at 62,119.
218. See id. at 62,120 (approving ComEd's proposal to solicit bids from its affiliate,
ExGen, in its upcoming auction).
219. See discussion supra note 216 (explaining the Allegheny factors). ComEd had to set
up the bidding process, employ a third party overseer, and then operationalize all of the steps to
meet the FERC's tests. See Commonwealth Edison, 113 F.E.R.C. at 62,118-62,119 (describing
ComEd's proposed power purchase agreement).
220. This approach does not facilitate efficiency for the utility because of the inherent
uncertainty of the process. The utility's planning on the front end does not ensure that its
proposal will be approved, and if a proposal is denied, the legal and corporate work is all for
naught. Additionally, this in-depth analysis is inefficient for a Commission which could set a
general guide, and approve all utilities that comport with its promulgated standards. Such an
approach would provide a degree of regulatory certainty and facilitate efficient regulation by
only scrutinizing utilities that fall outside the safe harbor.
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personality.221 As agencies interpret their statutory mandates, they tend to
internalize a particular mission, develop an agency culture, and cultivate a
unique expertise.222 EPAct 2005 gives the FERC the chance to redevelop its
agency culture in keeping with its new regulatory duties, and it appears that the
FERC is seizing this opportunity.
A. Will Things Be Different This Time?
While the FERC's recent developments are promising, it is important to
remember that the FERC has been practicing reactive and fragmented
regulation for more than seventy years.223 In 1988, the FERC aimed to produce
a predictable regulatory environment by issuing a rule providing a generic
determination of rate of return on common equity. 224 The rule addressed
complex and contentious issues regarding the appropriate methodologies to
determine a "fair" rate of return.225 In the years that the FERC calculated and
published a generic rate of return, the agency "never adopted the generic rate of
221. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, tit. 12,119 Stat. 594 (giving the
FERC new regulatory responsibilities). EPAct 2005 gives the FERC the tools necessary to
promulgate rules and regulations that will guide the industry into the next phase of
development. Id. The FPA gave the FERC discretion that is so broad that it could offer a more
or less plausible explanation for any conclusion it chose to reach on the matters coming before
it. See PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 875 (discussing the issues with broad delegations of power).
The sparse FPA provisions were the equivalent of instructing the Commission: "Here is the
problem. Deal with it." See 1 KENNETH DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 82 (West 2002)
(discussing inherent problems with broad congressional delegations of power).
222. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 12, at 2239 (2005) (discussing the culture and
expertise of the FERC).
223. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the FERC's reactive regulatory roots and
its preference for individualized decisions which each contain a fragment of the FERC's
developing policy).
224. See Generic Determination of Rate of Return on Common Equity for Public Utilities,
53 Fed. Reg. 3342 (proposed Feb. 5, 1988) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37). The FERC passed the
Rule in order to make more accurate and consistent determinations by focusing on a single
generic proceeding. See Generic Determination of Rate of Return on Common Equity for
Public Utilities, 18 C.F.R. pt. 37 (1992) (abolishing generic benchmark determinations, but
discussing the original reasons for the rule's inception). The rate of return is the amount of
money earned by a public utility, over and above operating costs, expressed as a percentage of
the rate bases. See PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 375-76 (discussing the concepts of a rate of
return).
225. See Generic Determination of Rate of Return on Common Equity for Public Utilities,
18 C.F.R. pt. 37 (1988) (adopting a procedure for determining and updating the benchmark rate
of return and discussing the FERC's mission to provide a fair rate of return).
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return in any proceeding., 226 Four years after issuing the rule, the FERC
repealed it, noting that:
The Commission thus balanced hopes that creation of an annual
proceeding to establish a benchmark rate of return would result in
improved analysis of industry trends, [and] resources savings...
against warnings by others that this proceeding would waste resources
and create problems. Despite this disagreement, the Commission
[passed the rule] based on hopes that the anticipated benefits of the
benchmark proceedings would in fact materialize and outweigh the
objections .... While the benchmark has produced some benefits, it
has not produced many of the benefits envisioned for it.
227
Bonbright and Means said it best: "Those familiar with the actual practice
of American rate regulation need no reminder about the uncertain
relationship between the supposed 'principles' of rate-of-return
determination... and the considerations that actually lead commissions to
allow whatever rates of return they do allow in specific cases." 228 What
began as a rule focused on accuracy and consistency became yet another
example of the FERC's instability.
22 9
The generic rate of return rule shows that true regulatory change
requires more than the use of a new process; it requires reexamination and
reformation of an agency's approach. EPAct 2005 imposed a drastic
change in the regulatory regime, and recent developments suggest that the
FERC is taking the opportunity to reexamine and reformulate its regulatory
approach.
B. Recent FERC Actions Indicate Change Is Occurring
The FERC's regulatory personality is a result of the 1935 Act and the
then-present political situation, 230 but EPAct 2005 gives the FERC the
226. See NOPR and Request for Comments on Whether the Commission Should Continue,
Abolish, or Alter the Generic Determination of the Rate of Return, 56 F.E.R.C. 61,276,
62,088 (1991) (concurring comments by Commissioner Trabandt).
227. Generic Determination of Rate of Return on Common Equity for Public Utilities, 18
C.F.R. pt. 37 (1992).
228. BONBRIGHT, ET AL. supra note 114, at 281. Prior decisions regarding the benchmark
show that "the benchmark has been a contested and controversial issue since its inception." Id.;
see Generic Determination of Rate of Return on Common Equity for Public Utilities, 18 C.F.R.
pt. 37 (1992) (discussing the justification for the rule's repeal).
229. See Generic Determination of Rate of Return on Common Equity for Public Utilities,
18 C.F.R. pt. 37 (1992) (discussing reasons for repeal of the original rule).
230. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the regulatory roots and regulatory
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opportunity to form new regulatory roots and a new regulatory approach. 3
Recent FERC actions indicate that the FERC is forming a regulatory
personality similar to that embodied by the SEC in its PUHCA 1935
23enforcement. 32 The new FERC remains committed to protecting
ratepayers, but now aims to also provide regulatory certainty. 233 Through a
rules and regulations approach, the FERC is building the foundation for a
stable regulatory environment that has the potential to guide the industry
into the next phase of development. The recent issuance of a Policy
Statement regarding enforcement, 34 a rulemaking promulgating anti-
manipulation standards, 235 and adoption of the "No-Action" letter process,
illustrate the FERC's new commitment to regulatory certainty and
stability.236 The FERC should make this personality change permanent to
help achieve the goals of EPAct 2005.
personality of the FERC prior to EPAct 2005).
231. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing FERC's new power to prevent market
manipulation).
232. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the regulatory personality and regulatory
behavior of the SEC in its administration of PUHCA 1935). The FERC has chosen to refer to
its new regulation as "PUHCA 2005." Press Release, Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, Comm'n
Proposes Rule on Holding Co. Reform (Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.ferc.gov/press-room/press-
releases/2005/2005-3/09-15-05-M- 1.asp#skipnavsub (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). For clarity, Title I of the 1935 Act will, henceforth, be
referred to as "PUHCA 1935."
233. See Press Release, Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, Comm'n Rescinds Mkt. Behavioral
Rules 2 and 6, Codifies Other Behavioral Rules in Regulations (Feb. 16, 2006)
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/nvcommon/NVViewer.asp?Doc= 10955826:0 (last visited Nov.
13, 2006) (announcing the FERC's adoption and subsequent rescission of the Market
Behavioral Rules) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The new regulatory
personality of the FERC will "go a long way toward protecting consumers from unscrupulous
behavior while providing clarity to the industry as to what is expected from them... [thus
avoiding] confusion and [providing] greater regulatory certainty." Id.
234. See Policy Statement, 113 F.E.R.C. 61,068 (2005) (noting that the FERC will
employ many of the considerations used by the SEC).
235. See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 4244 (Jan. 26,2006)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § lc) (discussing the SEC's interpretation of similar provisions and
voicing support of adopting a similar strategy).
236. See No-Action Letter Process, 13 F.E.R.C. 61,174 (2005) (basing the FERC's new
approach on the SEC's no-action letter process); see also Reply Comments of Edison Electric
Institute at 17, Docket No. RM06-3 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Nov. 17, 2005),
http://elibrary.fere.gov/idmws/File list.asp? documentid=4360333 (last visited Nov. 13, 2006)
(noting that the industry values, and needs, certainty) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). EEl believes that these provisions will both educate the industry and provide
guidance with regard to specific actions that market participants can take to protect themselves,
to structure effective compliance programs, and to avoid severe penalties in the unfortunate
event that an act of manipulation actually occurs. Id.
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1. Proactive Policy Statement on Enforcement
EPAct 2005 provides the FERC with the enforcement tools necessary
to ensure industry compliance. 237  The FERC now has the authority to
impose civil penalties for any violation of Part II of the FPA, as well as of
any rule or order issued thereunder,238 and may assess fines of $1,000,000
per violation per day.239 The FERC issued the Policy Statement to "provide
guidance and regulatory certainty regarding [the] enforcement of the
statutes, orders, rules, and regulations."2 40  The issuance of the Policy
Statement illustrates the FERC's new proactive approach to regulation.
In the Policy Statement, the FERC exhibits a commitment to
comprehensive regulation by considering its own past enforcement actions,
241
as well as the enforcement behavior of other agencies similarly situated.242 The
FERC expresses a commitment to the original FPA, but also promises to use a
flexible analysis similar to that of the SEC, Commodities Future Trade
Commission (CFTC), and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (FSG).243 The
first touchstone in determining the amount of the proposed penalty is the
seriousness of the violation.244  However, to provide "firm, but fair
enforcement, 2 45 the FERC also includes a list of questions and issues it will
consider when tailoring penalties for violations.246 The FERC has thus adopted
the individual balancing approach used by the SEC, the CFTC, and the FSG.247
The FERC promises to assess the degree of the violator's internal compliance
237. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1294(e)(1), 119 Stat. 594
(amending FPA § 316A).
238. See id. (amending FPA § 316A(a)).
239. See id. at § 1284(e)(2) (amending FPA § 316A(b)).
240. Policy Statement on Enforcement, 113 F.E.R.C. 61,068 (2005).
241. See id. at 61,244 (explaining the FERC's treatment of companies that did not comply
with its standards).
242. See id. at 61,245 (discussing the SEC and the CFTC patterns of assessing penalties);
cf discussion supra Part II.B. (discussing the FERC's acquisition of its new duties in 1935 and
its reliance on its own gas and water methods of regulation).
243. See id. at 61,244-61,245 (explaining that the seriousness of the violation is the first
touchstone, but stating the FERC's intent to adopt enforcement procedures similar to the SEC,
CFTC, and FSG).
244. See id. at 61,247 (listing the factors the FERC will consider when evaluating the
severity of the situation).
245. Policy Statement on Enforcement, 113 F.E.R.C. at 61,243.
246. See id. at 61,247-61,249 (presenting the questions the FERC will consider).
247. See id. at 61,246 (discussing the approach used by the SEC, the CFTC, and Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, and promising to use a similar approach when assessing penalties for
violations).
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programs, 248 the existence of self-reporting, 249 and the degree of the violator's
cooperation. 250 The FERC states that its decisions will "place a high value on
internal compliance, self-reporting, and cooperation... [and] where many
positive factors of internal compliance, self-reporting, and cooperation are
present, [it] will take those factors into account in determining the appropriate
penalties for violations."
2 51
The FERC's new comprehensive approach is illustrated by the extent and
variation of the factors it promises to consider in its analysis. Regulatory
standards should be flexible enough to adapt to changing economic conditions
and technological developments, but clear and specific enough to provide
guidance and predictability.2 2 While the Policy Statement does not contain an
exclusive list of the FERC's considerations, it provides a comprehensive guide
for the industry.25 3 By enumerating certain factors, but leaving the potential for
consideration of other issues as they arise, the Policy Statement appears to
strike the appropriate balance between broad and vague policies and guidelines
that are too tight and specific. 254  This clear and comprehensive Policy
Statement is one building block in the FERC's new regulatory foundation that
will help to produce a stable and efficient regulatory environment.
2. Anti-Manipulation Rule
Throughout the maze of the FERC's market-based rate decisions, there
exists a recurring theme of concern about the potential exploitation of market
255conditions. Prior to EPAct 2005, the rate proceeding was the main tool the
FERC used to protect ratepayers from potential market manipulation and
affiliate abuse.256 Utilizing complex tests like Edgar and Allegheny the FERC
248. See id. at 61,247 (listing the factors it will consider in assessing internal compliance).
249. See id. at 61,248 (listing the factors it will consider in assessing self-reporting).
250. See Policy Statement on Enforcement, 113 F.E.R.C. 61,068,61,248 (2005) (listing
the high standards of cooperation a company must meet to receive favorable treatment).
251. See PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 874-77 (providing an appraisal of how regulations
should be).
252. See Policy Statement on Enforcement, 113 F.E.R.C. 61,068, 61,249 (2005)
(providing potential considerations, but reserving the right to reexamine its planned approach).
253. See id. at 61,246 (explaining the factors guiding the FERC's Enforcement Remedies).
254. See PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 877 (discussing the compromise effective regulation
should strive to achieve).
255. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the FERC's skeptical view of the industry
and its concerns that an affiliate would exploit market conditions).
256. The FERC also required utilities to include a code of conduct in a market-based rate
application, and required the utilities to adhere to the Commission's Market Behavior Rules.
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prohibited utilities from exploiting market conditions, 257 and it seems that fear
was the driving force behind these tests.258 EPAct 2005 solves this
fundamental deficiency, and "provides the FERC with effective tools to assure
that market prices are not skewed by manipulative and/or fraudulent behavior
to the detriment of consumers. ,
259
EPAct 2005 amended the FPA to prohibit the use or employment of
manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances in connection with the
purchase or sale of electric energy, or transmission services subject to the
jurisdiction of the FERC.260  Rather than building its anti-manipulation
approach through individualized decisions, the FERC engaged in a notice and
comment rulemaking. 26' After soliciting and evaluating comments, the FERC
issued a Final Rule, Order 670, to prohibit market manipulation.262 Order 670
constitutes the second building block in the FERC's new regulatory
foundation.263
See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 4244,4254 (Jan. 26, 2006) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. § 1c) (discussing the Market Behavior Rules and their function).
257. See discussion supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the FERC's emphasis on tests which
prevented affiliates from abusing market conditions).
258. See Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Statement
on Anti-Manipulation Final Rule (Jan. 19,2006), http://www.ferc.gov/press-room/statements/
kelliher/2006/01-19-06-kelliher-C- 1.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) ("Congress gave us this
[anti-manipulation] authority out of recognition that wholesale power and gas markets had
changed dramatically since the 1930s. While our legal duty remains the same-protecting
wholesale power and gas consumers-we needed different regulatory tools to discharge this
duty.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
259. Chair and Immediate Staff, Response to United States Senator Jeff Bingaman, Docket
No. RM06-2 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Oct. 20, 2005), http://elibrary.ferc.gov/
idmws/File list.asp?documentid=4350785 (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
260. See Energy Policy Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1283, 119 Stat. 594 (giving the
FERC the authority to prevent market manipulation).
261. Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 113 F.E.R.C. 61,067 (proposed Oct.
20, 2005) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § Ic).
262. Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 4244 (Jan. 26, 2006) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. § Ic).
263. See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 113 F.E.R.C. 61,067, 61,243
(proposed Oct. 20, 2005) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § Ic) ("The Commission's new EPAct
2005 authority under the anti-manipulation provisions coupled with expanded civil penalty
authority, provides us with more effective tools to assure workably competitive markets."). The
timing of the issuance of the proposed rule is indicative of the Commission's new
comprehensive regulatory approach. In a press release, the Commission stated that:
The Commission is of the view that the persistent high energy prices in the wake of
severe damage to the United States' energy infrastructure from the hurricanes of
2005, together with the potential for severe price events in the event of cold winter
weather during the winter months of 2006, may present opportunity for energy
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The anti-manipulation provisions of EPAct 2005 closely track the
prohibited conduct language in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.264 The FERC recognized that the provisions are "patterned after SEC's
Rule 1 Ob-5, and are intended to be interpreted consistent with analogous SEC
precedent that is appropriate under the circumstances., 265 Order 670 makes it
unlawful for:
Any entity, directly or indirectly.., in connection with the purchase or sale
of electric energy or the purchase or sale of transmission services subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) to use or employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) to make any untrue statement or a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any act, practice, or course
of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
entity."
Although the FERC did not vary its position from the NOPR, it did provide
adequate consideration and evaluation of the issues raised by commentators.267
The FERC's consideration of the issues raised by the commentators
illustrates its new, responsive behavior.268 In Order 670, the FERC considered
price manipulation .... Immediate adoption of the Final Rule will protect natural
gas and electricity markets from manipulative conduct.
Press Release, Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, Comm'n. Finalizes Rule Barring Mkt. Manipulation
(Jan. 19, 2006), http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/File-list.asp?documentid=4371695 (last visited
Nov. 13, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
264. See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 4249-55 (explaining
the similarity between the two sections).
265. See id. (discussing lOb-5). The SEC's Rule lob-5 states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 Ob-5 (2005).
266. Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 4244.
267. See id. (addressing the issues presented in the comments). The comments identify a
number of issues, including the Final Rule's scope, the usefulness of securities precedents to the
energy industry, disclosure implications, elements of a violation, the interaction with market
behavior rules, and a variety of procedural matters. See generally Public Comments, Docket
No. RM06-3 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n), http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/ docketsearch.asp
(last visited Nov. 13, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
268. See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 4249-55 (finding
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Congressional intent,269 SEC precedent, 270 and the particularities of the energy
industry.271 The FERC's reasoned and logical responses show the FERC's new
272practice of considering and responding to the industry's issues and concerns.
The FERC's clear and comprehensive rule prohibiting market manipulation is
the second foundational building block that will facilitate production of a stable
and efficient regulatory environment.273
3. No-Action Letter Process
The final building block of the FERC's new regulatory foundation is the
adoption of the no-action letter policy. The no-action letter process will make
available informal, advance advice by staff on transactions that could otherwise
lead to an enforcement action later.274 The new FERC recognizes that
"[c]ompliance should not be elusive, it should not be subjective; it should be
objective to the greatest extent possible."275 The FERC's adoption of the no-
action letter process illustrates the FERC's shift from a reactive to a proactive
that it is appropriate to model the Final Rule on SEC Rule 1 Ob-5 in an effort to prevent fraud
and manipulation affecting the markets the Commission is entrusted to protect).
269. See id. at 4248 ("Had Congress intended to expand the Commission's jurisdiction so
significantly as to give it anti-manipulation authority over such transactions as... intrastate
sales of electric energy, retail sales of electric energy or energy sales by governmental entities,
we believe it would have done so explicitly."); Id. (deciding whether the limiting phrase "subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission" applies to only one or both the purchase or sale of
electric energy and the purchase or sale of transmission services).
270. See id. at 4259-55 (analyzing the elements necessary for a SEC enforcement claim
under 10b-5 and the history of interpretation of those elements).
271. See id. (giving consideration about which SEC precedents were applicable to the
energy industry).
272. See id. at 4248-55 (responding in a clear and concise manner to all major issues
raised in the public comments).
273. See Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Statement on
Market Behavioral Rules (Feb. 16, 2006), http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/nvcommon/NVViewer.
asp?Doc=10955844:0 (last visited Nov. 13,2006) ("[W]e take this action to reduce regulatory
uncertainty, to assure that all market participants are held to the same standard, and to provide
clarity to persons subject to our rules and regulations.") (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
274. See Interpretative Order Regarding No-Action Process, 113 F.E.R.C. 1 61,174 (2005)
(describing the no-action letter process).
275. Press Release, Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
Establishing a Clearer "No-Action" Letter Process (Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.ferc.gov/press-
room/statements/kelliher/1 I -1 7-05-kelliher-action.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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stance, and reaffirms the agency's express commitment to provide clarity and
regulatory certainty.
276
The SEC recognizes the relationship between proactive measures and
industry compliance, and utilizes no-action letters regularly to respond to
proposed transactions. 277 This allows the SEC to quickly and effectively
respond to new industry issues and proposals. 278 While non-binding, the no-
action letter still provides valuable guidance to the industry.279 The use of the
no-action letter process is one part of the SEC's proactive and comprehensive
regulatory approach, and its use has helped to produce a stable and effective
regulatory environment. 280 If the FERC continues to model its behavior off of
the SEC, it will likely produce a similar regulatory environment.
The use of the no-action letter process also indicates a new relationship
between the FERC and the industry. In its rule, the FERC noted that:
A number of industry participants have expressed concerns about the
perceived ambiguity and vagueness of the Standards of Conduct and
Market Behavior Rules and uncertainty about how they apply to the varied
corporate structures, business operations and trading strategies of
companies subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. There have been
several suggestions that the Commission consider implementing a no-action
letter process similar to those made available by the staffs of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) to provide, in advance, increased certainty on whether
particular transactions, practices or situations would be subject to agency
enforcement action.28'
Promising guidance in advance reflects a shift in the FERC's regulatory
behavior.28 2 Contrasted with the FERC's prior skepticism, this statement shows
28that the agency recognizes the value of a quick and guiding response. 83 The
276. See Press Release, Commission Implements "No-Action" Letter Process Designed to
Help Clarify its Rules (Nov. 17, 2005), http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/File_list.asp?docu
ment id=4355750 (last visited Nov. 13, 2006) (explaining the reasons behind the FERC's
adoption of the no-action letter process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
277. See LARRY D. SODERQUIST& THERESAA. GABALDON, SECURITES REGULATION 12-13
(5th ed. 2003) (discussing the SEC's use of no-action letters).
278. See id. (discussing the SEC's no-action letter process).
279. See id. (discussing the non-binding nature of the SEC's releases and no-action letters).
280. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the SEC's regulatory approach and the
resulting regulatory environment).
281. Interpretive Order Regarding No-Action Process, 113 F.E.R.C. 61,174, 61,707
(2005).
282. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the FERC's reactive approach which did
not focus on providing industry guidance).
283. See discussion supra Part III (discussing the FERC's skeptical view of the industry
1687
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1649 (2006)
FERC's responsiveness to the industry, and recognition of the values of
regulatory certainty, indicate that the FERC's regulatory approach is changing.
C. Will the FERC Remain Committed to Its New Regulatory Approach?
The FERC has recently built a foundation for a new regulatory
environment, but only time will tell if the FERC will remain committed to its
new approach. While a Chairman can have a significant impact on the
development of a commission, the staff performs the majority of the regulatory
functions.2 4 These recent FERC actions have been initiated and directed by
the Chairman, with the help and assistance of the staff. The next few years will
determine if the Commission as a whole is committed to changing FERC's
regulatory approach. 5 Without a regulator of the regulators, it becomes the
role of practitioners to ensure that the FERC remains committed to its new
regulatory character.28 6
The first signal of the FERC's true regulatory personality will be the
FERC's future use of the no-action letter. The no-action order only allows a
utility to seek a no-action letter if the matter relates to the "Standards of
Conduct for Transmission Providers, Market Behavior Rules, and the
Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation Rules."2 87 The FERC classifies
this as an initial limitation.288 The FERC claims that its mission is to produce a
firm, but fair, regulatory environment, and notes that this can only be achieved
if the regulated utilities have notice of the factors the FERC will consider.28 9
The FERC also recognizes that "the no-action letter process can yield
significant benefits to the entities subject to the statutes, regulations, rules, and
and explaining how the FERC's skepticism led to close scrutiny).
284. See PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 877 (discussing the FERC's workload and the role of
the staff in performing many duties with the Commissioners oversight).
285. See No-Action Process, 113 F.E.R.C. at 61,708 (noting that the ability of the staff to
provide informal advice on matters pertaining to regulatory requirements is valuable and that the
FERC fully intends the staff continue its present efforts).
286. For a complete discussion of the need for regulatory oversight, see generally JAMES R.
BOWERS, REGULATING THE REGULATORS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING (1990).
287. See No Action Process, 113 F.E.R.C. at 61,707 (discussing the initial limitations on
the use of the no-action letter).
288. See id. at 61,709 (stating that, as the Commission gains experience with the no-action
letter process it may, in the future, change the matters that may be subject to requests for no-
action letters).
289. See Policy Statement on Enforcement, 113 F.E.R.C. 161,068, 61,247 (2005)
(discussing the need to inform the industry of the factors when assessing penalties).
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orders administered by the Commission., 290 As the FERC gains experience
with the no-action letter process, the extensions or further limitations on its use
will indicate the FERC's evolving nature. If the FERC is truly a proactive and
comprehensive agency committed to regulatory certainty, it will extend the
availability of its no-action letter process to maximize regulatory certainty and
promote industry development.29'
In addition, the consistency of the no-action letters will help to evaluate
changes in the FERC's regulatory behavior. The first area to look to will be the
staff's consistency.292  To achieve the FERC's promised firm, but fair,
regulatory environment, and to provide regulatory certainty, the staff will need
to be consistent in the answers given in the no-action letters. All no-action
letter requests are to be submitted to the General Counsel, and the issue will be
examined by staff who are familiar with the regulations on which the no-action
letter process is focused.293 The consistency of both the delegations and the
answers will help to judge whether the FERC's regulatory actions comport with
its rhetoric. The second area to look to will be the FERC's consistency in
deferring to the staff's judgment. 294 The FERC has promised regulatory
certainty, and it is the duty of the commissioners to ensure certainty in the no-
action letter process. The FERC's consistent deference to the staff's
determinations, the degree that the commissioners scrutinize the staff's
findings, or the extent the commissioners remedy inconsistencies in the no-
action letters will help to illuminate the FERC's true regulatory approach. To
provide regulatory certainty, the treatment of no-action letters by the staff and
the commissioners must be consistent.
The second signal of the FERC's true regulatory personality will be its
adherence to the factors and considerations set forth in the Policy Statement.
The FERC declined to "prescribe specific penalties or develop formulas for
different violations," and chose to "retain the discretion and flexibility to
address each case on its merits, and to fashion remedies appropriate to the facts
presented. 2 95 In adopting such an individualized approach, there is the danger
that the FERC will regress to reactionary regulation, and consistency and
certainty will be lost. The FERC has promised to "develop a consistent
290. No Action Process, 113 F.E.R.C. at 61,708.
291. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the value of the no-action letter process).
292. See PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 877 (discussing the role and influence of the staff).
293. See Policy Statement on Enforcement, 113 F.E.R.C. 61,068, 61,709 (2005)
(discussing the procedures for submitting questions).
294. See PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 877 (noting that effective regulation requires that the
commissioners take responsibility for all phases of opinions).
295. See Policy Statement on Enforcement, 113 F.E.R.C. 61,068, 61,246 (2005).
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approach to the amount of penalties for misconduct so that the penalties are
similar in analogous cases, and are evenhanded for similar conduct. ' 296 The
degree of consistency, and the depth of the explanations for inconsistencies,
will help to judge the FERC's true regulatory approach. Inconsistency and a
lack of guiding standards will indicate a regression to old regulatory patterns,
while consistent applications and thorough explanations will indicate adoption
of the new proactive and comprehensive regulatory approach.
The final signal of the FERC's true regulatory personality will be the
degree of consistency in market manipulation enforcement actions. In
developing standards of market-manipulation, the FERC is in a situation similar
to its initial market-based rate decisions.297 In adjusting to its market rate
regulation, the FERC started off on solid ground, but quickly entered into a
quagmire of complex tests and seemingly inconsistent analyses.29' The
similarity of situations makes the FERC's market-based rate decisions an
appropriate juxtaposition to its new market manipulation enforcement duties.
The similarities and differences between the two will fully illustrate the degree
of change in the FERC's regulatory behavior.
V. Conclusion
Through the Policy Statement, Order 670, and adoption of the no-action
letter process, the FERC has laid the foundation necessary to produce an
efficient and stable regulatory environment. 299 To achieve the goals of EPAct
2005, the FERC regulatory environment needs to encourage industry
developments.3° PUHCA 2005 was intended to be a books and records statute,
not a "massive new regulatory regime. 30 1 The purpose of PUHCA 2005 is to
"help attract needed investment in the nation's electric utility infrastructure by
296. Id.
297. See discussion supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the FERC's new role as a market
regulator, and the development of an unstable regulatory environment when the FERC could not
come up with clear rules to guide the industry).
298. See discussion supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the FERC's new role as a market
regulator and the complex and fragmented policies it used to perform its new duties).
299. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing the recent actions that illustrate the
FERC's new regulatory foundation).
300. See PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 878 (discussing problems that arise from a slow and
inefficient regulatory commission).
301. See Reply Comments of Congressman Joe Barton at 1, Docket No. RM05-32 (Fed.
Energy Reg. Comm'n Oct. 21, 2005), http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/Filelist.asp?docu




eliminating arcane, duplicative, and burdensome regulations that have hindered
investment. " 30 2 A proactive and comprehensive rules and regulations approach
will help to achieve the goals of EPAct 2005.303
The FERC has been a reactive agency characterized by fragmented
policies, and its regulatory behavior has produced an unstable and inefficient
regulatory environment.3° In administering a parallel track of regulation, the
SEC produced a stable and efficient regulatory environment by adopting a
proactive and comprehensive approach to regulation.30 5 Fortunately, recent
FERC actions indicate that the FERC is undergoing a personality
transformation. The FERC has met every one of the ambitious deadlines of
EPAct 2005,306 and it appears that the FERC is embracing a proactive and
comprehensive rules and regulations approach.30 7 The FERC's new approach
to regulation mirrors the SEC's approach in administering PUHCA 1935, and it
is likely that if the FERC continues to follow the example of the SEC, it will
produce a stable and efficient electric utility regulatory environment.
However, old habits die hard. The FERC has taken steps that indicated a
personality change before, but it failed to provide regulatory decisions that were
in line with its stated policy approach.30 8 EPAct 2005 decisions are in their
early stages, and there is the possibility that the FERC will revert to its reactive
and fragmented approach. Only time will tell which regulatory personality the
FERC will embrace. EPAct 2005 anticipates great developments in the energy
industry, and a stable and efficient regulatory environment will likely support
and facilitate industry advancements. If the FERC continues on this path of
change, the goals of EPAct 2005 will be more readily achievable. It will be the
role of practitioners to ensure the FERC remains committed its new regulatory
approach.
302. Id. at 3.
303. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing how the SEC achieved the goals of
PUHCA 1935 through its creation of a stable and efficient regulatory environment).
304. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the FERC's reactive decisions, fragmented
policy development, and the resulting uncertainty for the regulated utilities).
305. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the SEC's successful administration of
PUHCA 1935).
306. For full details of the Commission's EPAct 2005 actions and progress, explore the
FERC's designated EPAct 2005 webpage at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/fed-sta/ene-
pol-act.asp.
307. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing recent FERC actions and the FERC's new
regulatory foundation).
308. See discussion supra Part IV.A (discussing the FERC's failed generic rate of return
rule).
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